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by Major W.H.V. Matthews, MC and Bar, Officer Commanding, 
"A" Company, 1st Canadian Scott ish Regiment to Historical 
Officer, 19 October 1944 
Channel Ports of BOULOGNE and CALAIS, 
the first determined resistance was offered to 
the rapid advance along the coast. There was 
no question of the garrisons joining in the 
general retreat; rather they prepared for a 
siege in order to deny the Allies the use of 
these valuable prizes as long as possible. 
Although their avowed decision was to fight 
to the death, still this heroic mood existed 
almost exclusively in the hearts of those who 
exercised command, and was not the 
prevailing characteristic of either garrison. 
The capture of BOULOGNE ( 17-22 September 
1944) confirmed that fact. 
Desp i t e c e r t a i n s imi l a r i t i e s of 
c i r c u m s t a n c e , the c a p t u r e of CALAIS 
presented a very different problem from that 
of BOULOGNE. Whereas the latter fortress 
had based its defence on the prominent 
features which enclosed it, CALAIS could 
show no comparable eminence of land, and 
its defence was in fact dependent on water 
o b s t a c l e s a n d low, m a r s h y g r o u n d . 
Inundation had greatly added to the difficulty 
of attacking the city. 
Only on the west side was the terrain 
judged to be favourable, owing to a prominent 
feature, BELLE VUE RIDGE, which, from its 
highest point at NOIRES MOTTES, runs 
eastward towards the flooded ground around 
the city. This area was in enemy hands. On 
the east and south the ground was considered 
to be too low and marshy to permit a successful 
initial attack. The enemy moreover possessed 
complete command of these approaches. 
Nor could the problem be solved with the 
reduction of the outer defences alone, as was 
substantially the case at BOULOGNE. Within 
the city itself were many canals, well-defended, 
which divided it into islands, and imposed 
further obstacles. 
The enemy had positioned himself in the 
following areas around the city: ESCALLES -
NOIRES MOTTES; BELLE VUE RIDGE; VIEUX 
COQUELLES' LES BARAQUES; and at the 
eastern and southeastern approaches. The 
garrison was made up of Army, Navy and Air 
Force personnel, as in BOULOGNE, and was 
c o m m a n d e d by L i e u t e n a n t - C o l o n e l 
Schroeder, himself a naval officer. Its strength 
was a first judged to be from 4,500 to 5,500. 
The surprising total of PW from BOULOGNE 
(nearly 10,000) caused a later revision of this 
estimate which brought it to around 7,000. 
This was fairly accurate. 
Throughout the siege and attack on 
BOULOGNE the investment of CALAIS had 
been left principally to 7th Canadian Recce 
Regiment, with the Toronto Scottish Regiment 
(Machine Gun) on the east flank. Initially, 
7th Canadian Recce Regiment gave its 
attention to CAP GRIS NEZ, for which it was 
responsible, finally leaving light mobile forces 
to contain that area when it moved to a 
position southwest of CALAIS on 18 September 
1944. With the fall of BOULOGNE 8th 
Canadian Infantry Brigade moved to its left 
flank, facing CALAIS, and 9th Canadian 
Infantry Brigade took over the siege of CAP 
GRIS NEZ. The eastern sector of the CALAIS 
perimeter was taken over by the Cameron 
Highlanders of Ottawa (MG) from the Toronto 
Scottish Regiment (MG). 
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Left: German coastal battery 
at Cap Blanc Nez west of 
Calais. This photograph puts 
into perspective the size of the 
bomb craters on the ground, 
the size and depth of which 
can be deceiving when seen 
on aerial photographs. 
CFPU PMR 84-12 
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7th and 8th Canadian Infantry Brigade 
Groups were to make the assault from the 
southwest, first wresting from the enemy the 
desirable high ground. They were to be 
supported by armour, artillery and heavy 
bombing. The inter-brigade boundary, all 
inclusive to 7th Canadian Infantry Brigade, 
commencing its attack with two battalions 
up, was to capture BELLE VUE, COQUELLES 
and CALAIS. 8th Canadian Infantry Brigade 
on the left had the task of capturing the 
ESCALLES and NOIRES MOTTES area, 
likewise advancing on a two-battalion front; 
its third battalion was to be in reserve. The 
taking of the ESCALLES feature, which 
overlooked CALAIS, was essential for the 
success of 7th Canadian Infantry Brigade. 
The air plan envisaged heavy bombing on 
the CALAIS area, the target circumference 
decreasing each time as our troops advanced. 
For the artillery fire plan the same method 
was adopted as used so successfully at 
BOULOGNE, i.e. a generous allotment of 
concentrations, both pin-point and linear, (A 
linear concentration is usually known as a 
stonk or straight cone. ) on all potential sources 
of opposition. 
On the morning of 25 September 1944 the 
operation began. Royal Winnipeg Rifles on 
the right advanced towards COQUELLES and 
Regina Rifles on the left on BELLE VUE 
RIDGE. 1st Canadian Scottish Regiment 
were to go through later to the coast area to 
destroy the strongpoints there. 
While the first objectives were being 
attacked, 1st Canadian Scottish Regiment 
remained in the vicinity of BONNINGUES-
LES-CALAIS, awaiting orders to move forward. 
Late in the afternoon the battalion rode up in 
Kangaroos to PEUPLINGUE, and proceeded 
from there to the wooded area on BELLE VUE 
RIDGE. From the height "A" and "C" Company 
Commanders surveyed the ground to the 
north jus t before dark. 
Weather conditions had deteriorated sadly 
and it was a wet and miserable night as "A" 
and "C" Company Commanders set out to 
recce the area of LA GRANDE COUR. The foul 
weather caused them to lose their way more 
than once and a special difficulty arose from 
the fact that the track shown on the maps as 
running from BELLE VUE to LA GRANDE 
COUR simply did not exist. Stumbling through 
the darkness, the officers commenced to follow 
a track which they assumed to be the right 
one, only to find themselves eventually in 
SANGATTE, well in front of the forward troops. 
They withdrew hurriedly, for there was 
abundant evidence of the enemy's presence 
there. Somewhat discouraged after several 
more fruitless attempts to locate the farm, 
they returned to Regina Rifle Battalion HQ. A 
report had now come in that LA GRANDE 
COUR was a difficult position, so the idea of 
using it as a base was abandoned, and it was 
proposed to establish a foothold in SANGATTE 
itself around first light. 
Near daylight on 26 September "A" 
Company advanced quickly into SANGATTE 
and settled itself without much opposition 
near the church. "C" Company was following 
some distance behind. One platoon of "A" 
Company moved to the west to deal with a 
blockhouse, which they cleared quickly. Major 
Matthews, taking stock of the area, observed 
movement on NOIRES MOTTES, around the 
three cross-channel guns. A few rounds fired 
in that direction produced a vigorous show of 
white flags. Captain Gillan, 2 i /c "A" 
Company, went up to investigate and the 
garrison of the battery position surrendered 
to him. The huge 406 mm guns were out of 
action, and the German gunners, awaiting an 
opportunity to surrender, were mostly in a 
state of inebriation. This curious phenomenon 
in enemy garrison troops had been met with 
before, in BOULOGNE. 
When "C" Company arrived in SANGATTE 
there commenced a lengthy lead-frogging 
process eastwards along the coast road 
towards CALAIS. "C" Company, passing 
through "A" worked its way up to the road 
fork. Here they became the target of an 
inaccurate, but disturbing, enemy flame-
thrower , which slowed the i r advance 
temporarily. "A" Company, following behind, 
encountered and cleared a strongpoint. "C" 
Company then continued its sweeping process 
up to LE CRAN. 
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"A" Company now moved ahead, taking 
out two strongpoints in the sand dunes at the 
left of the road in LE CRAN. The area up to 
TROUILLE FARM was cleared and the two 
platoons of "A" Company advanced into LES 
BARAQUES. They found the village almost 
completely flattened by bombing. One went 
to the church, while the other, turning left, 
proceeded to attack FORT LAPIN. After a 
brisk fight, one fort was captured, with some 
50-60 PW. It was discovered, however, that 
the area consisted of not one, but several 
forts, so that the bulk of the defences had still 
to be overcome. Before this process, which 
they had begun so well, could be continued, 
the order was given to withdraw, since they 
were too near the target area of a proposed 
heavy bombing attack. All forward troops 
were drawn back to TROUILLE FARM while 
the bombing took place. On the west, 8th 
Canadian Infantry Brigade had by now 
completed its task without having employed 
its reserve battalion. 
In the afternoon of the next day, Major 
Matthews and a FOO went forward to lay 
plans for the capture of FORT LAPIN, in 
which tanks and artillery were to be employed. 
To reach a suitable point of vantage, the recce 
party had to cross an open stretch across the 
sand dunes , during which time enemy 
machine guns raked the area, hitting no one 
however. The OP officer now found his wireless 
set out of order and the artillery support 
consequently not available. 
The tanks of 6th Canadian Armoured 
Regiment meanwhile were near TROUILLE 
FARM and already blasting the forts from 
there. As yet they could go no further. Both 
infantry and armour were waiting to attack. 
There was an uncomfortable moment as the 
tanks commenced to move forward, for there 
was no way to inform them of the hitch in 
plans. As they drew level, however, they 
came to a stop, and engaged enemy positions 
while the targets were indicated to them by 
shouting. One fort was set on fire by their 
shells. 
At dusk the infantry crossed the road to 
the north and the armour eased back. A 
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silent attack was launched on FORT LAPIN. 
One platoon of "A" Company under a sergeant 
wriggled into the fort area and took out the 
n e a r e s t s t rongpo in t . Their p r i s o n e r s 
announced that the remainder would quit, 
given some encouragement. The platoon 
therefore went on to the next fort, while a 
second passed through it to take out others. 
The third went on to LES BARAQUES to 
secure that village. 
The plan now envisaged "C" Company 
following "A", and "B" Company going through 
on the left into the citadel of CALAIS, using 
pontoon bridging to cross the water obstacles. 
Simultaneously "D" Company was to swing 
through on the right, using collapsible boats, 
and likewise enter the citadel. In the final 
phase, the entire battalion was to consolidate 
within the citadel. 
Two platoons of "A" Company in FORT 
LAPIN soon had captured the whole area, 
including its commander. The inevitable 
hospital, with medical officer and patients, 
also fell into their hands. The third platoon 
oc the company met sterner opposition in 
LES BARAQUES and was pinned down by 
fire until "C" Company entered the village, at 
which time by their combined weight they 
succeeded in clearing it almost to its eastern 
edge. On the right "D" Company now worked 
out to the railway bridge. The majority crossed 
over unhindered and commenced to form up 
prior to attacking the citadel. But they 
suddenly came under severe shelling from 
"Bastion 11", from the citadel itself and from 
their right. Thus caught they were pinned to 
the ground and could not withdraw owing to 
the intensity of the fire. 
"B" Company meanwhile had attempted 
to cross north of the railway bridge close to 
the bastion. But the forward platoon was 
likewise immobilized by fire directly in front 
of its walls. The rear platoons were still free 
and were sent to the right to cross the canal 
by "D" Company's route. This they succeeded 
in doing and were of course at once in the 
same unhappy situation. "C" Company had 
also sent a platoon to follow "D" and it too was 
pinned. 
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This air photo shows the northwest environs of Calais attacked by the Canadian Scottish Regiment at the end 
of September. At the top left can be seen Fort Lapin and Les Baraques where "A" and "C" Companies were 
established. Between Bastion 11 (top centre) and the Citadel (partly visible at right) was the area where "B" and 
"D " Companies were trapped. WLU Air Photo 184/4181 
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At 0300 hours, 28 Sep, the battalion 
picture was not a bright one. "A" Company 
had two platoons in FORT LAPIN, and one 
platoon and company HQ in LES BARAQUES 
waiting to go forward. "B" Company had one 
platoon and its company HQ pinned down to 
the right of the road before the bastion; its 
o ther two p la toons were in the same 
predicament beyond the railway bridge near 
the citadel. Nearly all of "D" Company was 
pinned down beyond the bridge. One platoon 
of "C" Company was in the same area; the 
other two with company HQ were under very 
heavy fire in LES BARAQUES. Tactical 
Battalion HQ was now also located in LES 
BARAQUES, having moved there from 
TROUILLE FARM. Even that town was 
uncomfortable, with machine gun rounds 
whistling through the streets, and Battalion 
HQ shortly returned to the farm. "A" Company 
moved its HQ to FORT LAPIN. In effect only 
one company—"A" Company—had freedom 
of movement. 
Towards morning "B" and "D" Companies 
made attempts to extricate themselves without 
success. Communications had by now fallen 
down badly. Somewhat later "A" Company 
cleared the enemy from the strongpoints 
between FORT LAPIN and the bastion, thus 
relieving the pressure on "C" Company in LES 
BARAQUES; patrols from "C" Company 
succeeded in bringing food to "D" Company 
near the citadel. 
In the evening of 28 Sep, Lieutenant-
Colonel Schroeder, the garrison commander, 
requested a parley at 1000 hours, 29 Sep. 
Firing ceased. On the following morning, a 24 
hours ' truce was declared to allow civilians to 
leave CALAIS. The garrison commander had 
refused to surrender. 
Inasmuch as international conventions 
permit no regrouping of forward troops during 
the period of the armistice it was not possible 
even to withdraw the two companies whose 
positions were so isolated. Prior to the parlay, 
however, Queen's Own Rifles of Canada, the 
reserve battalion of 8th Canadian Infantry 
Brigade, had already stationed themselves 
on the eastern perimeter of CALAIS, and 
plans were now formed to launch an attack 
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from that sector on 30 Sep, when the armistice 
had expired. Their intention was to capture 
or destroy all enemy up to the line of the canal 
just east of grid line 89. Another massive air 
attack and an extensive artillery programme 
were prepared to lend weight to the final 
blow. While this attack was in progress 7th 
Canadian Infantry Brigade was to eliminate 
enemy posts in front of its battalion positions 
prior to the resumption of the main assault 
against the city. In this second phase 1st 
Canadian Scottish Regiment was to capture 
CALAIS NORD; Royal Winnipeg Rifles and 
Regina Rifles were to capture CALAIS SUD. 
At the same time Queen's Own Rifles of Canada 
and Cameron Highlanders of Ottawa were to 
clear eastern CALAIS to the line of the next 
canal. 
For 1st Canadian Scottish Regiment this 
meant that "A" Company, being the only 
unrestricted sub-unit, should first capture 
the bastion and that after dark all companies 
should surge forward into CALAIS. 
At 1200 hours, 30 Sep, the attack was 
begun. "A" Company sent a platoon under 
Lieutenant Milton to the right into the bastion, 
aide by Crocodiles. With this support they 
were successful in breaking into the bastion 
area and proceeded to clear it. Amongst its 
earthworks — relics of an older fort—the enemy 
h a d c o n s t r u c t e d dug- in conc re t e 
emplacements. 
During this time smoke was laid between 
the bastion and the fort at 854787. When it 
was observed that the first platoon had 
achieved partial success on the right, a second 
p la toon, u n d e r L i eu t enan t C h a m b e r s , 
attacked the fort on the left. It was cleared 
quickly so that Lieutenant Chambers was 
able to join Lieutenant Milton in the bastion 
where fighting was still going on. This too 
was soon captured. 
With its fall a succession of white flags 
appeared in a long line from enemy posts 
right up to FORT RISBAN. In the bastion "A" 
Company hoisted its own flag, presented by 
the Princess Royal, above the swastika, 
thereby offending many Germans, as it later 
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appeared. The CO came up and decided to 
exploit the success thus gained, without 
waiting for darkness. "C" Company was 
ordered to advance through "A" Company. 
This it did, crossing by the railway bridge 
to the citadel, and freeing "D" and "B" 
Companies, who had been pinned there for so 
long. All three companies now continued to 
move in to CALAIS NORD, which was 
thoroughly demolished. As a final measure 
"C" Company crossed the avant port by the 
bridge at 875789 to clear the quay to the 
north. At its tip was a fort still in enemy 
hands, whose commander, while ready to 
surrender, insisted on doing so to the CO. 
This was arranged and at 0300 hours, 1 
October 1944, the German commander and 
his men departed as prisoners of war. 
Lieutenant-Colonel Schroeder had already 
surrendered to Cameron Highlanders of 
Ottawa, and Regina Rifles and Royal Winnipeg 
Rifles had occupied CALAIS SUD, Queen's 
Own Rifles of C a n a d a a n d C a m e r o n 
Highlanders of Ottawa had advanced to the 
line of the canal which was their objective. 
The capture of CALAIS was complete. 
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